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An erratum on
Valence of emotions and moral decision-
making: increased pleasantness to pleas-
ant images and decreased unpleasantness
to unpleasant images are associated with
utilitarian choices in healthy adults
by Carmona-Perera, M., Martí-García, C.,
Pérez-García, M., and Verdejo-García, A.
(2013). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:626. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00626
We have noticed that wemade an incorrect
interpretation of the correlation between
valence ratings to unpleasant pictures and
proportion of utilitarian choices (Figure 1,
Panel A, left side). The Figure is cor-
rect but our interpretation was wrong.
We originally interpreted that decreased
unpleasantness was associated with higher
utilitarism, but the data points to the
opposite direction: increased unpleasant-
ness is associated with higher utilitarism.
This interpretation error impacts the third
line of the published title (“decreased
unpleasantness to unpleasant images”
should be “increased unpleasantness to
unpleasant images”), line 11 of the abstract
(“less unpleasantness to negative stim-
uli” should be “more unpleasantness
to negative stimuli”), and one line in
the Results subsection “ASSOCIATION
BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE REACTIVITY
TO EMOTIONAL STIMULI AND
UTILITARIAN CHOICES AND DIFFI-
CULTY RATINGS TO DILEMMAS”: the
sentence “experiencing less unpleasantness
in response to unpleasant images (both
moral and non-moral), and more pleas-
antness in response to pleasant images
were associated with more utilitarian
choices (see Figure 1A)” should be “expe-
riencing more unpleasantness in response
to unpleasant images (both moral and
non-moral), and more pleasantness in
response to pleasant images were asso-
ciated with more utilitarian choices (see
Figure 1A).” Moreover, in the first para-
graph of the Discussion, finding (2) “lower
experience of unpleasantness” should be
“higher experience of unpleasantness.”
Therefore, while we originally argued that
findings “support the notion that dimin-
ished experience of unpleasantness favors
utilitarian choice patterns,” the correct
interpretation is that “increased experience
of unpleasantness favors utilitarian choice
patterns.”
During replication of the whole set
of statistical analyses in SPSS v. 20, we
have noticed additional errors in the
Results section. The F-value of the within-
measures comparison of valence ratings
should be 1143.97 instead of 143.97.
Several r-values from correlation anal-
yses were incorrect and the Bonferroni
correction to p-values was incorrectly
applied. Therefore, here, we present the
correct r-values and exact p-values of these
analyses, and we clarify the Bonferroni-
corrected alpha level to interpret results.
The exact p-value of the correlation
between moral choices and valence rat-
ings to unpleasant moral images should
be 0.004 instead of the published value
(0.016). The exact p-value of the correla-
tion between moral choices and valence
ratings to unpleasant non-moral images
should be 0.011 instead of the published
value (0.043). The r and exact p-values
of the correlation between moral choices
and valence ratings to pleasant images
should be r = 0.21 and p = 0.040 instead
of the published values (r = 0.26, p =
0.047). The r and exact p-values of the
correlation between moral choices and
arousal ratings to unpleasant moral images
should be r = 0.31 and p = 0.002 instead
of the published values (r = 0.34, p =
0.004). The r and exact p-values of the
correlation between difficulty ratings and
dominance ratings to unpleasant non-
moral images should be r = −0.24 and
p = 0.020 instead of the published val-
ues (r = −0.26, p = 0.043). The r and
exact p-values of the correlation between
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difficulty ratings and dominance ratings
to unpleasant moral images should be
r = −0.31 and p = 0.002 instead of the
published values (r = −0.29, p = 0.016).
When applying a Bonferroni correction
taking into account 2 types of dilem-
mas and 4 image conditions, the alpha
value for all the correlations reported
must be established at 0.006. Three pre-
viously unreported correlations concern-
ing impersonal moral dilemmas were
detected utilizing these parameters: a neg-
ative correlation between unpleasantness
ratings to unpleasant pictures and util-
itarian choices (r = −0.33, p = 0.001),
a negative correlation between unpleas-
antness ratings to moral-laden pictures
and utilitarian choices (r = −0.37, p <
0.001) and a positive correlation between
arousal ratings to moral-laden images
and utilitarian choices (r = 0.32, p =
0.002).
To recap, in the published article we
reported four main findings, namely: (1)
individual differences in self-reported
emotional experience correlate with
decision-making in moral scenarios, but
not in non-moral scenarios; (2) lower
experience of unpleasantness to both
moral and non-moral unpleasant images
and higher experience of pleasantness
to pleasant images are associated with
utilitarian choice patterns; (3) higher
experience of arousal (specifically in
response to moral laden images) are asso-
ciated with more utilitarian choices, and
(4) lower dominance over emotions is sig-
nificantly associated with higher perceived
difficulty to make decisions in moral
scenarios. In this Erratum, we note that
finding (2) should be reappraised as fol-
lows: higher experience of unpleasantness,
mainly to moral unpleasant images, is asso-
ciated with utilitarian choice patterns. This
association was observed for the combined
measure of utilitarian choices to moral
dilemmas, and for utilitarian choices to
impersonal dilemmas. Moreover, the cor-
relation between pleasantness ratings and
utilitarian choices would not survive a
Bonferroni correction. Our revamped
conclusion about the direction of cor-
relations is that increased negative valence,
increased arousal and lower dominance to
emotional stimuli correlate with utilitar-
ian choices. This interpretation cannot be
easily framed in the dual-process theory
(paragraph 3 of the Discussion) which has
been useful to explain utilitarian choices
in clinical populations, but actually fits
better with the notion that certain types of
negative emotions are linked to utilitarian
choices in healthy populations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Dr. Indrajeet Patil
for making us aware of the interpretation
error concerning Figure 1.
Received: 04 December 2013; accepted: 22 January 2014;
published online: 13 February 2014.
Citation: Carmona-Perera M, Martí-García C, Pérez-
GarcíaM and Verdejo-García A (2014) Erratum:
Valence of emotions and moral decision-making:
increased pleasantness to pleasant images and decreased
unpleasantness to unpleasant images are associated
with utilitarian choices in healthy adults. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:50. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00050
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Carmona-Perera, Martí-García,
Pérez-García and Verdejo-García. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 50 | 2
